This paper presents evidence of a positive but very small long run relationship between income growth and happiness, evidence that can disprove the Easterlin Paradox. However, the paper argues that there is actually reason to sustain the paradox because it finds the magnitude of the estimated relationship too small to suggest that income growth has substantial consequence in improving happiness over the long-term. Certainly, the evidence suggests that happiness is more than about raising incomes. This paper argues that a rejection of the paradox is acceptable if and only if the empirical findings indicate economic significance.
INTRODUCTION
This paper is yet another intervention to the continuing debate on the Easterlin Paradox. Simply put, the paradox refers to a contradiction between the short run or cross-section evidence of a positive income-happiness relationship and the long run or time series evidence of a nil incomehappiness relationship. This situation is problematic because it goes against the conventional idea that a positive income-happiness relationship exists regardless of the time perspective adopted in the analysis.
Briefly, a summary of the debate can include the following observations. First, Easterlin (1974 Easterlin ( , 1995 Easterlin ( , and 2001 argues that hedonic adaptation to income and social comparison in income operate to cancel out any short run impact of income growth and/or make happiness revert to its long run level despite the income growth. Notice the argument does not say that income growth cannot affect happiness-in fact, it does but under the restrictive condition of ceteris paribus.
Second, Stevenson and Wolfers (2008) , as well as the associated studies of, among others, Deaton (2008), Inglehart et al. (2008) , Diener et al. (2013) , and Veenhoven and Vergunst (2013) , present evidence that refute the empirical findings of Easterlin and those with colleagues (e.g., Easterlin and Angelescu 2009; Easterlin and Sawangfa 2010; Easterlin et al. 2010 ). Stevenson and Wolfers, maintain that a statistically insignificant association between income growth and happiness is not at all proof of the absence of a long run relationship between the two variables, as hinted above.
The Easterlin group, in turn, counters by saying that what the Stevenson-Wolfers group presents as robust evidence against the paradox is merely the short run relationship and, if so, the paradox remains valid (c.f., Easterlin 2013 Easterlin and Angelescu (2009) also argue that a positive coefficient on income growth that Wolfers and Third, both groups in fact report positive but very small estimates on the so-called long run income-happiness relationship (c.f., Oswald 1997; Veenhoven and Hagerty 2006; Clark and Senik 2011; Veenhoven and Vergunst 2013) . Their empirical findings in fact suggest that income growth is not the end-all and be-all to happiness. Such is the case because income growth and happiness are essentially two disparate concepts: one measures the economy's welfare-albeit, in a not comprehensive way-and another measures people's welfare-albeit, not without problems.
Moreover, there is an issue with regard to the transformation of income growth into happiness:
happiness is neither a definite nor an automatic consequence of income growth. What is clear in the extant literature is that many other things constitute happiness. There is also another issue concerning how social values and preferences have become inextricably linked to money, income, or wealth that turns out to be not decisive in raising happiness and have become detached to, say, relationships, community, and citizenship that are critical to happiness. Of course, ensuring that analyses are sound and robust is important; but, it seems, the debate has become more about the statistical significance of the evidence and not about what it reveals in practical terms.
The foregoing introduction acknowledges that the debate on the Easterlin Paradox is one of those situations in which scholars are examining an issue using dissimilar perspectives and empirical strategies. This paper, in turn, contributes to the debate by asserting that an economic significance reading of the evidence might be more helpful toward a better understanding of the paradox itself.
Correspondingly, the paper argues that a rejection of the paradox should hinge on an affirmative answer to the question: Does the long run relationship between income growth and happiness indicate economic significance?
To that end, the Easterlin Paradox is the null hypothesis of this study. The analysis takes income
Stevenson found is the result of data from transition economies that cover the post-transition period but not pre-transition period. growth and happiness as the key variables. Specifically, the study takes the dynamics of income growth, happiness adaptation to income, and social comparison in income as the underpinning processes in the income-happiness relationship. Like the Easterlin and Stevenson-Wolfers groups, this paper uses country-level data; but, unlike the two groups, it chooses a dynamic time series procedure for the analysis and, in turn, determines if the evidence carries economic significance.
The rest of the paper has the following structure. Part 2 presents a framework for an analysis of the Easterlin Paradox. A discussion of the data and empirical strategy follows in Part 3. The empirical findings and implications come in Part 4. The last part concludes the paper. (Duesenberry 1952; see also Pollak 1976 and Frank 1985 Helson 1964 and Pollak 1970) , the current level of happiness adaptation to income takes the form
FRAMEWORK

Conceptual Framework
where α is the rate of adaptation with a value between 0 and 1. 
initial condition of Equation 1b) and Equation 4 becomes
or, simplifying further, , and λ > 0 because 1 > α > 0.
Empirical Framework
Equation 5c presents an autoregressive process in happiness as the basic setup; that is, there is social expectation that current level happiness depends on its past levels. 4 All the same, an
is necessary in order to measure the net impact of the income stimuli on happiness across time. One reason for doing so is that the impact of the income stimuli might not be apparent in the short run but manifest only after some period has lapsed. Another reason is that the impact of the income stimuli manifests in the short run but there are also other effects in the subsequent periods. Thus, a distributed lag process in ] y , y , y [ F r t e t t is appropriate to account for the habit process that involves the current and past values of the income stimuli.
If so, Equation 5b becomes
In short, a dynamic analysis of the income-happiness relationship takes on an autoregressive 
METHODOLOGY
Data and Description of Measures
This paper uses the longest annual time series data available in testing the Easterlin Paradox. In this regard, Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, and
United Kingdom comprise a convenient sample because they have data from 1973 to 2012. More 5 Suppose β 0 > 0 and set θ 0 = φ 0 = 0. The initial impact of y t on H t is β 0 . All things the same, the initial impact β 0 translates as β 0 λ 0 on H t-1 , β 0 λ 0 λ 1 on H t-2, β 0 λ 0 λ 1 λ 2 on H t-3 , etc. Suppose, too, y t-1 has an impact of β 1 > 0. All things the same, the subsequent impacts of β 1 are β 1 λ 0 on H t-1 , β 1 λ 0 λ 1 on H t-2, β 1 λ 0 λ 1 λ 2 on H t-3 , etc.
Graham (2009), for example, argues the case of an "unhappy growth" or β 0 < 0. If so, the impacts of -β 0 are -β 0 λ 0 on H t-1 , -β 0 λ 0 λ 1 on H t-2, -β 0 λ 0 λ 1 λ 2 on H t-3 , etc. In either β 0 or -β 0 notice a "steady" adjustment process as H t moves towards its new equilibrium.
important, the available data are comparable across the sample countries. each country takes a value between 4 (maximum) and 1 (minimum).
Empirical Strategy
Stutzer ( Specifically, I estimate the following econometric model
where j refers to Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, and United Kingdom; and ε jt is the residual term.
Given that the identification of the reference groups (i.e., superior and peer groups) is problematic because of its endogeneity to income growth and given that the conventional procedure of fixed effects to control for the unobservable country-level heterogeneity is not efficient because of the autoregressive setup, the GMM-SYS is therefore the appropriate procedure in the estimation of Equation 6. Moreover, given that the number of lags on the regressors is not set ex ante, I resort to a sequential procedure in the estimation of Equation 6b-that is, the lagging of a regressor stops when the coefficient on its subsequent lag turns out statistically insignificant. At the same time, I rely on the Arellano-Bond autocorrelation test as another guide in the determination of the lags of regressors. I however note that the aforementioned studies that use dynamic specifications report short lags on happiness and even shorter lags on the income stimuli. Figure 1 shows the decadal trends in income growth and happiness for the nine countries: y t has been falling but H t has been rising, albeit slightly, across the decades. Meanwhile, Figure 3 and s H = 0.04). In contrast to Figure 2 , H t is relatively stable throughout the period; yet, it seems to display mild, albeit it is almost unnoticeable, fluctuations across the years. The data show that Denmark has the highest and Italy has the lowest average for the whole period. The full sample has the following key statistics = H 3.15, s H = 0.25, and range of 0.80 (which is equivalent to two notches on a 1 to 10 scale (i.e., 0.08 times 2.5)) with the mode falling between 3.0 and 3.5.
FINDINGS
Descriptive Findings
[Insert For Models 2 to 5, in particular, the results lead to the following observations. First, in these four specifications, there is clearly no short run impact of income growth on happiness (all β 0 > 0, but p= n.s.). More interestingly, the size of the β 0 s in Table 1 is comparable to the estimates reported by Stevenson and Wolfers (2008) , using data from the Eurobarometer, and those by Veenhoven and Vergunst (2013), using data from the World Happiness Database.
Empirical Findings
The results on the one-period lag and the two-period lag on income growth have opposing signs-the latter term shows a negative coefficient, thereby indicating that a long run adjustment in income growth occurs in the second year. At the same time, the three-period lag on income growth is statistically insignificant (not shown in table) for Models 2 to 5. Therefore, the results not only indicate that there is a long run impact of income growth on happiness but there is also a quick adjustment in the way income growth gets to affect happiness. Indeed, this empirical finding is consistent with Di Tella et al. (2001 . Across Models 2 to 5, the average of (β 1 + β 2 ) is 0.0030, which turns out to be comparable to that in Veenhoven and Vergunst (2013) .
Across Models 2 to 5, too, the average of (β 0 + β 1 + β 2 ) is 0.0044. In short, the net impact of income growth (alone) across time is positive but, without a doubt, very small in magnitude.
Second, the measures for social comparison in income give the anticipated findings. Interestingly, though, the results bare short and long run impacts of expectation income growth on happiness. In contrast, there is no short run but only a long run impact of relative income growth on happiness.
For both measures, a two-period lag is statistically insignificant (not shown in table). The average of (θ 1 + θ 2 ) is 0.0014 and, for (φ 1 + φ 2 ), -0.0006 at best. Therefore, these results indicate that a positive outlook with regard to economic performance is conducive to happiness even in the short run; it is in fact large enough to offset the negative impact of income comparison on happiness.
The average net impact of the income stimuli (i.e., ] y , y , y [ F r t e t t ) using the estimates in Models 2 to 5 is 0.0051, which in turn obtains an average long run relationship between income growth and happiness of 0.0782. 8 This long run estimate implies that an overall 2 per cent net growth of the income stimuli sustained for at least 20 years is necessary in order to increase the average H t of the sample countries from 3.15 to 3.20. At, say, 5 per cent net growth of the income stimuli, the time requirement to reach the 3.20 target is 8.2 years. 9 It is thus evident from the calculations that the long run impact of income growth is very small. Put another way, income growth must be very large in order to achieve a very small increase in happiness. Notwithstanding these findings, I note that the more difficult issue in the context of the sample countries is of course achieving a respectable level of income growth in the present economic conditions and political environment in Europe, a topic that is outside the scope of the present study.
Some implications
The empirical findings of the study confirm a statistically significant positive long run relationship between income growth and happiness, thereby suggesting a rejection of the Easterlin Paradox is necessary. Even so, a substantive reading of the results leads to a reconsideration of the paradox because, in closer inspection, the evidence is not robust in economic terms. Ziliak and McCloskey (2008) , for instance, assert that the size of the estimated relationship must be large enough to matter-that is, the results must indicate the "oomph". In the context of the paradox, then, the oomph means checking if the evidence has meaning and consequence to happiness that it would not be possible to dismiss it as a trivial result. If so, the evidence in this paper has established that income growth has very little oomph in terms of happiness.
Therefore, the answer to the query "Does the long run relationship between economic growth and happiness indicate any economic significance at all?" is a "No". The Easterlin Paradox is a valid proposition because, as the evidence reveals, the long run impact is trivial in magnitude.
Let me also point out that a dismissal of statistical significance in favor of economic significance is not the same as committing a Type II error because statistical significance remains the basis for embracing economic significance. Let me further point out that this conclusion does not mean that income growth per se does not or cannot bring any benefit to society in general or to happiness in particular; but, rather, it simply demonstrates that any effect from income growth accrued in the short run does not endure in the long run perspective. Therefore, other factors may be much more effective in raising happiness in the long term.
Ultimately, the conclusion based on economic significance proposed in this paper draw attention to the following issues regarding the Easterlin Paradox. First, the results expose the fundamental differences between income growth and happiness, namely: income growth is largely about the economy's welfare but happiness is mainly about people's welfare. While they are not necessarily contradictory elements, there is however no guarantee that the former translates as the latter and do so consistently across time. In this context, then, income growth may be a good measure about the economy-albeit, it is not a comprehensive measure of economic performance-but it is not, and probably never was, a good measure for happiness.
Nonetheless, it is also important to add that a more sensible position with regard to the paradox is not a complete rejection of an income-based approach if only because income growth functions as a means for making possible the things and activities that promote the enjoyment of a good life and encourage the social relationships that support happiness. At the same time, income growth makes the provision of basic services necessary for human development possible through public taxation and other public measures. Therefore, a broader approach to happiness is a more sensible direction to take if the goal of society is to raise happiness. Such an approach is certainly crucial in order to have a sensible evaluation of people's welfare.
Second, the natural tendency to compare human welfare and disregard of adaptation tends to lead to an overemphasis on income growth as a determinant of happiness. Yet, the situation is also the consequence of an education system and mass media that glorifies achievement, competition, and profitability. In such a context, then, an income-based approach serves a mediating metric in the performance of comparison but with limited success because it is difficult to do given that human welfare is fundamentally an internal human experience.
Proper education and the regulation of the mass media in order to direct them toward building relationship, community, and citizenship essential for happiness can address the above problem.
Yet, such a demand is difficult to pursue unless a transformation of the institutional foundations that define the capitalist system takes place as well. In short, a holistic approach is necessary.
Finally, even though earlier studies on the Easterlin Paradox raised the trivial magnitude of the income-happiness relationship, the extant literature in general has given too little attention to the economic significance reading of the evidence that actually validates the paradox. Perhaps, then, a discrepancy in the interpretation of the evidence is yet another dimension to an explanation why there is an impasse on the paradox.
CONCLUSION
That the pursuit of economic progress has consequential impacts to people and societies is not a Yet, from the same analysis, the size of the purported long run relationship is too small to matter.
This evidence-highlighting the economic significance of the results-leads to the conclusion that income growth in itself is not a very effective tool for raising happiness. This conclusion comes natural when using a perspective that goes beyond income in the interpretation of the results. All the same, an outright rejection of the Easterlin Paradox is not defensible given the evidence. If people are born into social realities that define their values and preferences, then it follows that there is an inextricable connection between the collective appraisal and outlook in life to the same underlying foundations. As such, sound education and the regulation of the mass media thus play important roles in shaping and directing human preferences toward relationship, community, and citizenship that are valuable to human welfare. Yet, the suggestion does not mean that incomebased metrics are worthless altogether because they are still needed to obtain resources that secure the provision of an education system and the regulation of the mass media so, in the end, people get to enjoy the opportunities that permit them to go as far as possible in advancing their life circumstances. The evaluation of life then is not limited to income-based metrics but becomes concrete in terms of how people are able to pursue and achieve the "good life". Society in this way achieves the greatest happiness. It is in the context of this economic interpretation that the empirical findings in this paper affirm the Easterlin Paradox.
Future research might consider introducing time varying variables that mediate between income growth and happiness like social or relational capital as a measure of social progress. The idea is that economic and social progress should go hand in hand in creating an environment conducive for happiness. I can surmise, however, that such analysis will sustain the positive but small longrun relationship between income growth and happiness. Besides, the addition of time varying
APPENDIX
Recall the generalized framework 
In fact, Equation 7b is the original workhorse of the Easterlin group (c.f., Easterlin 1974 Easterlin , 1995 Easterlin , and 2001 . 
Equations 7a (7b) and 8a (8b) make up the "basic model" from which a dynamic specification is possible for econometric estimation. . The peer groups in models 2 and 3 now include the US.
